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Insurance assessment organization came into being at the very beginning for the 
purpose of relieving contradictions in the settlement of claims resulted from 
asymmetric information in insurance market, which is a typical market of information 
asymmetry. Insurance assessor is short for insurance assessment organization, which 
is an insurance intermediary institution engaging in transactions on insurance objects 
such as assessment, examination, appraisal, and calculation under the trust deed of 
insurance parties. By their professional privilege, insurance assessors offer 
information service, strengthen communications and coordination between insurance 
parties to insure smooth insurance activities like underwriting, claim, etc. 
However, the market of insurance assessment is also a market of information 
asymmetry. The assessor’s behavior influence both insurers and insurants. If assessors 
use superiority of information to assess unsuitably or they do not do justice to 
insurance parties, it will influence benefit of insurance parties. 
Insurance assessment organization institution is an important part of insurance 
agency system. Problems remain to be urgent like how to improve Chinese insurance 
assessment organization institution and how to standardize insurance assessment 
organization institution and insurance assessors’ behavior. 
For the above-mentioned reasons, this paper use asymmetric theory to analyze 
principal-agent problem, adverse selection problem, and hazard risk problem. These 
analyses lay a solid foundation for a detailed research on the present situation of 
Chinese insurance assessment organization institution in this paper. 
Finally, the paper put forward some proposals to improve Chinese insurance 
assessment organization institution. 
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